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OPINION 
 
 McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 
 Geoffry Kouevi  appeals his convictions for visa fraud 
and conspiracy to commit visa fraud.  His primary argument 
on appeal is that his conduct is not criminalized by the part of 
the statute he was indicted under. His appeal raises a question 
of statutory construction that is an issue of first impression in 
this Circuit.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
judgment of conviction.  
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDUDRAL HISTORY 
 
 Geoffry Kouevi, also known as “Kangni,” was born 
and raised in Lome, Togo.  The Government  contends that 
from 2001 until 2005, Kouevi conspired with others to use 
fraudulent means to obtain “authentic” visas for at least 34 
people through the American Embassy in Togo, and that 
those persons then used those visas to enter the United States.  
The scheme involved “diversity visas.” 
 
 The United States makes diversity visas available to 
citizens of countries who send relatively low numbers of 
immigrants to the United States each year.  The visas are a 
means of promoting diversity within the annual pool of 
immigrants entering the United States.  See Coraggioso v. 
Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 730, 732 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 8. U.S.C. 
§ 1153(c)).   Individuals in Togo applied for diversity visas 
by entering the diversity visa lottery.  If they won that lottery, 
they became eligible to apply for permanent resident status in 
the United States, and if that status was granted, they were 
then permitted to immigrate with their spouse and children.  
The lottery winners were classified as DV-1 applicants; 
spouses were classified as DV-2 applicants; and their children 
were classified as  DV-3 applicants.  
 
 According to the evidence at Kouvei‟s trial,  Kouevi 
worked for the leader and organizer of the conspiracy, 
Akouavi Kpade Afolabi, otherwise known as “Sister,” and 
with other co-conspirators, to obtain authentic visas through 
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fraudulent means by working with individuals in Togo who 
were actually eligible for diversity visas, but were unable to 
either complete the necessary paperwork, pay the required 
fees, or afford the airfare to the United States.  According to 
the Government, Afolabi paid the required fees of persons 
who were eligible for the diversity lottery and assisted them 
in completing their paperwork.  In exchange, Afolabi required 
the applicants to falsely represent that other unrelated 
individuals were their spouses and/or children, so that those 
individuals could also obtain visas to enter the United States 
under the program. 
 
 Kouevi played two roles in this conspiracy.  He was 
responsible for coordinating the preparation of false 
documents used to support the fraudulent visa applications, 
and he tutored participants in the details of their false 
identities to prepare them for their interviews at the American 
Embassy in Togo.  He also accompanied visa applicants to 
government offices in Togo and helped them acquire false 
passports, marriage certificates, and similar documents 
required to support their visa applications.  This included 
obtaining additional false evidence of purported relationships 
including fake wedding rings and fake wedding pictures. He 
quizzed the applicants about the details of their identities and 
otherwise coached them in how to successfully interview at 
the American Embassy.  He then took them to the American 
Embassy for their interviews.  In return, Afolabi helped 
Kouevi fraudulently obtain his own visa and paid his costs for 
the visa and airfare to come to the United States.   
 
 Kouevi came to the attention of The Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) after Afolabi was arrested.  DHS 
Investigators concluded that Afolabi had enticed girls as 
young as 13 from villages in West Africa with promises of 
education and employment in the United States.  The 
Government contends that, using the visas she obtained with 
the assistance of Kouevi and others, Afolabi, brought the girls 
to the United States and forced them to work at hair braiding 
salons for up to 16 hours a day, 6 to 7 days a week, for 
several years, without any pay.  These girls were forced into 
what can only be described as “slave labor;” they were also 
subjected to beatings, verbal and psychological abuse and 
rape.  
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 On January 15, 2009, a federal grand jury sitting in 
Newark, New Jersey, returned a 23-count Superceding 
Indictment against Afolabi, Kouevi and two others.  Kouevi 
was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit visa 
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and two counts of visa 
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) and § 2 (aiding and 
abetting).   
 
 On July 14, 2009, the district court severed Kouevi‟s 
case from his co-defendants, who were charged with more 
serious crimes, including forced labor.
1
 A federal grand jury 
subsequently returned a two-count indictment charging 
Kouevi with conspiracy to commit visa fraud, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 37, and visa fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1546(a).  
 
 The Government called nine witnesses at the ensuing 
trial. They included Ouyi Nabassi, Bella Hounakey (“B.H.”), 
Awa Fofana (“A.F.”), Ahoeft Amah (“A.A.”), and Vida 
Anagblah (“V.A.”). These witnesses testified about their own 
visa applications and embassy interviews, and their 
interactions with and observations of Afolabi and Kouevi in 
connection with those applications and interviews, and the 
applications and interviews of others.   
 
 The jury convicted Kouevi on both counts and he was 
sentenced to 26 months imprisonment. This appeal followed.  
 
II. DISCUSSION
2
 
                                              
1
 Because the DHS concluded that Kouevi did not know that 
his co-conspirators were engaged in forced labor, he was not 
charged with that offense. 
 
2
 In his brief, Kouevi makes five arguments in support of his 
appeal. However, only one issue merits discussion, i.e., that 
his conviction for violating the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 
1546(a) should be reversed because that provision of the 
statute does not criminalize the use of authentic immigration 
documents that are procured by fraud.   The other four 
arguments are as follows:  (1) the conviction for violating § 
1546(a) must be reversed because it was based on an 
unconstitutional constructive amendment of the indictment; 
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A.  THE CONVICTION FOR VIOLATING 18 U.S.C. § 
1546(a).  
 
 Kouevi contends that his conviction for violating 18 
U.S.C. § 1546(a) should be reversed because the paragraph of 
the statute he was convicted of violating does not criminalize 
activities involving authentic immigration documents.  His 
argument attempts to distinguish between producing a 
counterfeit or fraudulent passport or visa and obtaining an 
authentic passport or visa by fraudulent means. He argues that 
Congress only intended to criminalize the former conduct and 
since the evidence here only proved the latter conduct, his 
actions are not criminal under § 1546(a).
3
 
 
 Kouevi was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 
1546(a) by conspiring and aiding and abetting others: 
to utter, use, possess, obtain, 
accept and receive immigrant 
visas, namely diversity visas, for 
entry into and as evidence of 
authorized stay and employment 
in the United States, knowing that 
the diversity visas have been 
                                                                                                     
(2) the district court erroneously permitted Officer Ayala to 
testify without any notice to the defense; (3) the conviction 
must be reversed based upon statements made during the 
Government‟s rebuttal; and (4) the sentence should be 
vacated and the matter remanded because the district court 
failed to make specific findings before imposing a six-level 
increase under U.S.S.G. § 2L2.1(b)(2)(B).    
 
     We have reviewed these four arguments and conclude that 
they do not merit further discussion.  Indeed, Kouevi‟s 
constructive amendment claim is dependent on his claim that 
the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) does not apply to 
the use of authentic immigration documents procured by 
fraud.   
 
3
 “We apply a plenary standard of review to issues of 
statutory interpretation.”  United States v. Randolph, 364 F.3d 
118, 121 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).     
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procured by means of false claims 
and statements and otherwise 
procured by fraud and unlawfully 
obtained. 
 
Kouevi and the Government agree that he was charged under 
the first paragraph of § 1546(a),
4
 which provides: 
Whoever knowingly forges, 
counterfeits, alters or falsely 
makes any immigrant or 
nonimmigrant visa, . . . or other 
document prescribed by statute or 
regulation for entry into the 
United States, or utters, uses, 
attempts to use, possesses, 
obtains, accepts, or receives any 
such visa, . . . or other document 
prescribed by statute or regulation 
for entry into or as evidence of 
authorized stay or employment in 
the United States, knowing it to 
be . . . procured by means of any 
false claim or statement, or to 
have been otherwise procured by 
fraud or unlawfully obtained 
[commits an offense under this 
section]. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).    
 
 Kouevi contends that the first paragraph of § 1546(a), 
should not apply to his conduct because it only reaches forged 
visas. He argues that the text of the statute shows that 
Congress did not intend to criminalize possessing an 
authentic visa that was obtained by fraud, such as a visa 
obtained by lying on an application or during a visa interview 
- as happened here.  According to Kouevi, the fourth 
paragraph of § 1546(a) prohibits that conduct, and he was not 
charged that portion of the statute.  The fourth paragraph of § 
                                              
4
 Section 1546 is captioned “Fraud and misuse of visas, 
permits, and other documents.” 
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1546(a), states:  
Whoever knowingly makes under 
oath, or as permitted under 
penalty of perjury under section 
1746 of title 28, United States 
Code, knowingly subscribes as 
true, any false statement with 
respect to a material fact in any 
application, affidavit, or other 
document required by the 
immigration laws or regulations 
prescribed thereunder, or 
knowingly presents any such 
application, affidavit, or other 
document which contains any 
false statement or which fails to 
contain any reasonable basis in 
law or fact [commits an offense 
under this section]. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).    
 
 Kouevi argues that because he was charged with the 
first paragraph, and not the fourth paragraph, his conviction 
must be reversed.
5
   In short, he asks us to reverse his 
conviction because the visas he helped procure were 
authentic, and not forged.  Thus, he claims that the district 
court should have granted his motion for judgment of 
acquittal at the close of the Government‟s case. See  
Fed.R.Crim.P. 29.    
 
 First, Kouevi contends that in United States v. 
Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293 (1971), the Supreme Court 
concluded that the first paragraph of § 1546(a) does not 
prohibit the possession or use of authentic immigration 
                                              
5
 Kouevi‟s contention that the fourth paragraph of § 1546(a) 
criminalizes the possession of an authentic immigration 
document obtained by fraud is incorrect.  The fourth 
paragraph criminalizes making a false statement when 
applying for an immigration document.  
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documents that were obtained by fraud.
6
  He relies on the 
following excerpt from the Court‟s opinion: 
The statutory provision in 
question prohibits, inter alia, the 
counterfeiting or alteration of, or 
the possession, use, or receipt of 
an already counterfeited or altered 
“immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, 
permit, or other document 
required for entry into the United 
States.”  
 
Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. at 295.  According to Kouevi, it is 
clear from this statement that the Court concluded that the 
first paragraph of the statute prohibits only  the possession or 
use of a forged immigration document,  not the possession or 
use of an authentic immigration document that was obtained 
                                              
6
 The first paragraph  of  § 1546(a) in effect in 1971 provided:  
 
Whoever . . . knowingly forges, 
counterfeits, alters, or falsely 
makes any immigrant or 
nonimmigrant visa, permit, or 
other document required for entry 
into the Unites States, or utters, 
uses, attempts to use, possesses, 
obtains, accepts, or receives any 
such visa, permit, or document, 
knowing it to be forged, 
counterfeited, altered, or falsely 
made, or to have been procured 
by means of any false statement, 
or to have been otherwise 
procured by fraud or unlawful 
conduct. . . . 
 
Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. at 295 n.1. 
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Much of his argument rests upon his interpretation of 
Campos-Serrano. We are not persuaded.  
 
 The issue in Campos-Serrano was whether the 
possession of a counterfeit alien registration card was 
punishable under the first paragraph of § 1546(a).  The Court 
held that it was not because alien registration cards were not 
required for entry into the United States.  Campos-Serrano, 
404 U.S. at 296. The alien registration cards were issued after 
the alien had entered and took up residence in the United 
States, and played no part in the  entry. The cards were 
merely intended to identify the bearer as a lawfully registered 
alien residing in the United States.  They played no role in the 
alien‟s entry. Id.    
 
 In short, the issue before the Court was whether a 
particular forged document was proscribed by the statute, not 
whether the first paragraph of the statute criminalizes the 
possession of an authentic immigration document obtained by 
fraud.   The language Kouevi relies upon is merely the 
Court‟s summation of a portion of the first paragraph of the 
statute; it is not an explanation of the statute‟s reach or scope.  
Indeed, it is apparent to us that by identifying the crimes, 
“inter alia,” that § 1546(a) covers, the Court was not 
attempting to describe the entire reach of the first paragraph 
of § 1546(a).   
 
 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agrees. The 
defendant in United States v. Krstic, 558 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 
2009), also contended that the first paragraph of § 1546(a) 
does not criminalize the possession of authentic immigration 
documents obtained by fraud, and he relied upon the same 
language in United States v. Campos-Serrano that Kouevi 
relies upon.  In rejecting that argument, the court explained:  
The passage on which Krstic 
relies merely serves as general 
background information about the 
statute; it does not purport to be a 
comprehensive catalog of all 
conduct prohibited by the statute.  
The Court‟s usage of the phrase 
“inter alia” confirms this reading. 
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558 F.3d at 1014. 
 
 Nonetheless, Kouevi contends that appellate courts 
have followed Campos-Serrano‟s lead and have opined that 
the first paragraph of the statute was not intended to 
criminalize activities related to authentic immigration 
documents obtained by fraud, and that it cannot be read to 
reach that conduct.   However, the cases Kouevi cites simply 
summarize a portion of the first paragraph of § 1546(a), while 
interpreting other language in the statue. The following 
examples illustrate this point.   
 
 In United States v. Uvalle-Patricio, 478 F.3d 699, 702 
(5th Cir. 2007), the court of appeals wrote that “[t]he first 
paragraph of § 1546(a) criminalizes possession of forged 
immigration documents.”  (citation omitted).  The defendant 
in Uvalle-Patricio was charged with possession of blank 
immigration permits, which is prohibited by the second 
paragraph of § 1546(a),
7
 not the first paragraph.  Thus, the 
court of appeals‟ statement simply summarizes a portion of 
the first paragraph of § 1546(a), not a description of all of the 
conduct prohibited by it. 
 
 In United States v. Ryan-Webster, 353 F.3d 353 (4th 
Cir. 2003), the court of appeals wrote:  
While the fourth paragraph of § 
1546(a) deals with documents 
containing false statements, the 
first paragraph of § 1546(a) 
directly concerns documents 
containing, inter alia, forgeries.  
 
Id. at 363 n.16 (emphasis in original).  The defendant there 
forged the signatures of purported employers on certain 
documents in order to obtain legal permanent resident cards 
for her clients.  The issue was whether those documents were 
prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into the United 
States or prescribed as evidence of an authorized stay or 
                                              
7
 The second paragraph of § 1546(a) generally criminalizes 
the possession,  by persons not authorized by the Attorney 
General or another proper official, of materials that can be 
used to produce false immigration documents.   
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employment in the United States.  The issue was not whether 
the first paragraph criminalizes the possession of authentic 
immigration documents procured by fraud.   Here, again, the 
court‟s statement was merely its summation of the first 
paragraph, and its use of  “inter alia” once again makes that 
clear.  
 
 Finally, in United States v. Osiemi, 980 F.2d 344, 348 
(5th Cir.1993),  the court of appeals, commenting on the first 
paragraph of § 1546(a), wrote: “[S]trictly construed, taken 
literally, and given its plain and ordinary meaning, the 
language of § 1546(a), as amended, criminalizes the knowing 
possession of any counterfeited or altered document 
prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into the United 
States.”  The issue in Osiemi was whether a counterfeit 
foreign passport is a document “prescribed by statute or 
regulation” for entry into the United States within the 
meaning of § 1546(a).  Id. at 346.  The defendant contended 
that because the counterfeit foreign passport was not issued 
by the United States and/or because it did not contain a 
United States entry visa, no offense had been committed 
under § 1546(a).  Id. at 345.   The court of appeals held that a 
foreign passport was typically a document required for entry 
into the United States and, therefore, the possession of a 
counterfeit foreign passport was an offense under § 1546(a).   
The issue was not whether the defendant possessed an 
authentic immigration document obtained by fraud.  Thus, the 
court‟s statement about § 1546(a) was limited to the facts 
before it and cannot be taken to describe all of the conduct 
proscribed by the first paragraph of § 1546(a).   
 
 The only court of appeals that has directly addressed 
Kouevi‟s contention has rejected it and has held that the 
possession of an authentic immigration document obtained by 
fraud is a crime under the first paragraph of § 1546(a).  The 
defendant in United States v. Krstic, supra, was charged with 
knowingly possessing an alien registration card which he 
knew to have been procured by means of a materially false 
statement.  Krstic, 558 F.3d at 1012.  The indictment did not 
charge that the alien registration card was forged, 
counterfeited, altered or falsely made.  Id.  Rather, it simply 
charged Krstic with obtaining an alien registration card by 
means of a false statement.  Id.   
12 
 
 Krstic made the same argument that Kouevi now urges 
upon us about the limited reach of the first paragraph of 18 
U.S.C. § 1546(a).
8
  The district court agreed with him and 
dismissed the indictment, id. at 1012-13, and the Government 
appealed.  The court of appeals began its analysis by noting 
that: 
At first glance, the statute appears 
to prohibit two independent acts. 
The first part criminalizes 
“knowingly forg[ing], 
counterfeit[ing], alter[ing], or 
falsely mak[ing]” an immigration 
document.  The second part seems 
to punish “possess[ing]” an 
immigration document “knowing 
it to be forged, counterfeited, 
altered, or falsely made, or to 
have been procured by means of 
any false claim or statement.”    
 
558 F.3d at 1013.  The Government wanted the court to 
interpret the statute in “this bifurcated way.”  Id.    
 However, the court reasoned that “[t]he words „any 
such‟. . . which appear between the paragraph‟s two halves, 
                                              
8
 As recited above, the first paragraph of § 1546(a) provides: 
Whoever knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters 
or falsely makes any immigrant or 
nonimmigrant visa, . . . or other document 
prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into 
the United States, or utters, uses, attempts to 
use, possesses, obtains, accepts, or receives any 
such visa, . . . or other document prescribed by 
statute or regulation for entry into or as 
evidence of authorized stay or employment in 
the United States, knowing it to be forged, 
counterfeited, altered, or falsely made, or to 
have been procured by means of any false claim 
or statement, or to have been otherwise 
procured by fraud or unlawfully obtained 
[commits an offense under this section]. 
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).   
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complicate our task.”  Id.  It said: 
 
Krstic contends that “any such” 
refers back to the phrase 
“knowingly forges, counterfeits, 
alters, or falsely makes any 
immigrant or nonimmigrant visa.” 
In Krstic‟s view, the statute 
contemplates an immigration 
document that has been forged, 
counterfeited, altered, or falsely 
made, not an authentic document.  
The Government, on the other 
hand, maintains that “any such” is 
shorthand for the phrase 
“immigrant or nonimmigrant.”  
According to the Government, 
“[t]here is simply no reason why 
the verbs from the first clause 
should be converted into 
adjectives applicable to the 
second.” 
 
Id.  The court was not persuaded by either reading. Id. 
(“neither side has the better of this argument.”).     
 
 Rather, the court concluded that it could not resolve 
the question solely by parsing the statutory text.  Id. at 1015.
9
  
Accordingly, it turned to the legislative history.  The court 
held that the legislative history demonstrated to its 
satisfaction  
that § 1546(a)‟s first paragraph 
does not require proof of an 
already forged, counterfeited, or 
falsely made immigration 
document.  The section prohibits 
possessing an otherwise authentic 
document that one knows has 
been procured by means of a false 
claim or statement. 
                                              
9
 The court of appeals in Krstic found that the plain language 
of the statute was ambiguous.  558 F.3d at 1015.   
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Id. at 1017 (emphasis added).   The court explained:  
Common sense confirms our 
interpretation.  As the 
Government correctly points out, 
reading § 1546(a)‟s first 
paragraph as applying only to an 
already forged or counterfeited 
immigration document results in 
“leaving beyond the statute‟s 
scope the obvious harm of using 
or possessing an authentic 
document that one knows to have 
been procured by fraud or false 
statement to immigration 
authorities.”  To be sure, Krstic 
could have been charged under 
the fourth paragraph of § 1546(a), 
as well as under 8 U.S.C. § 
1306(c), two provisions that 
prohibit making false statements 
to immigration authorities.  The 
first paragraph of § 1546(a), 
however, criminalizes acts that 
neither the fourth paragraph of § 
1546(a) nor 8 U.S.C. § 1306(c) 
covers: possession of an 
immigration document that was 
fraudulently obtained.  In view of 
the statutory history, we decline to 
adopt a reading that would 
effectively decriminalize such 
conduct. 
 
Id. (emphasis in original).   
 
 Legislative history is only an appropriate aid to 
statutory interpretation when the disputed statute is 
ambiguous.  See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 244 
(3d Cir. 2009), aff’d Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S.Ct. 
1068 (2011).  However, a fundamental canon of statutory 
construction removes any ambiguity here, and provides a 
more direct path to the result reached in Krstic. 
15 
 
 Reading the statute as Kouevi suggests we must would 
have the practical effect of reading some of the language out 
of the statute. The only way to give meaning to the whole 
paragraph is to read the term “any such” as referring to the 
list of immigration documents, but not to the ways in which 
the immigration documents were falsified.
10
  Otherwise, the 
last clause (“or to have been procured by means of any false 
claim or statement, or to have been otherwise procured by 
fraud or unlawfully obtained,”) is transformed into 
surplusage; it would add absolutely nothing to what comes 
before it.
11
  Such a reading would violate a fundamental 
canon of statutory construction. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 
533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (“It is our duty to give effect, if 
possible, to every clause and word of a statute.”) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Nordic 
Village, 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992) (It is a settled rule “that a 
statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that 
every word has some operative effect.”) (citation omitted); 
Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 
1997) (“We strive to avoid a result that would render 
statutory language superfluous, meaningless, or irrelevant.”) 
(citation omitted).   
 
 Despite the fact that the plain language of the first 
paragraph of § 1546(a) prohibits the possession and use of 
authentic immigration documents obtained by fraud, Kouevi 
contends that Congress‟s actions since Campos-Serrano show 
that the first paragraph of § 1546(a) has always been limited 
to forged documents.  He claims that since Campos-Serrano, 
Congress has amended § 1546(a) eight times, and notes that 
                                              
10
 To arrive at the result that Kouevi wants, the term “any 
such” would have to be read to refer to the list of the ways in 
which the immigration documents were falsified, but not to 
the documents themselves.  However, such a reading would 
make the final clause of the first paragraph surplusage and 
ineffective.   
 
11
 As noted, see n.9, supra, the Krstic court found that the 
plain language of the statute was ambiguous, but, as the 
Government points out, it did not consider the surplusage 
created by the ambiguity it believed was present.   
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Congress has never amended the statute to alter Campos-
Serrano‟s conclusion that the first paragraph of § 1546(a) 
applies only to the possession or use of an already 
counterfeited or forged immigration document.
12
  However, 
this is not persuasive because, as we have explained, the 
Court in Campos-Serrano did not attempt to describe the 
entire reach of § 1546(a), nor did it purport to do so.   
 
 Moreover,  Kouvei‟s reading would mean that, in 
enacting this statute, Congress criminalized use of a forged or 
fraudulent visa, but did not intend to also criminalize 
obtaining an otherwise valid visa by means of forgery or 
fraud.  We think it extraordinarily unlikely that Congress 
intended that result.  See, e.g., In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 
456 F.3d 328, 338 (3d Cir. 2006) (“A basic tenet of statutory 
construction is that courts should interpret a law to avoid 
absurd or bizarre results.”) (citation omitted).   
 
 Kouevi‟s second argument relies on the amendment 
history of § 1546(a) and other immigration statutes.  He 
claims that history demonstrates that Congress did not intend 
the terms “falsely makes” and “falsely made” in § 1546(a) to 
cover authentic diversity visas that were fraudulently 
obtained.  Kouevi notes that in 1996, Congress amended 8 
U.S.C. § 1324c and added a definition of  “falsely make.”  
Section 1324c  of Title 8 is captioned: “Penalties for 
document fraud.”  Section 1324c(f) was added in 1996.  That 
                                              
12
 According to Kouevi, Campos-Serrano controls because 
Congress‟s failure to amend a statute after the Supreme Court 
interprets it (especially where Congress has otherwise 
amended the statute) is evidence that Congress agrees with 
the Court‟s interpretation.  
In support of that statement Kouevi cites to Safeco, Inc. v. 
Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 58 (2007) (noting “the interpretative 
assumption that Congress knows how we construe statutes 
and expects us to run true to form”); Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 225 (1984) (“We usually 
presume that Congress is . . . aware of [our longstanding] 
interpretation of a statute and [adopts] that interpretation 
when it re-enacts [the] statute without [explicit] change . . . 
.”).   
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amendment defines “falsely make” as follows:  
For purposes of this section, the 
term “falsely make” means to 
prepare or provide an application 
or document, with knowledge or 
in reckless disregard of the fact 
that the application or document 
contains a false, fictitious, or 
fraudulent statement or material 
representation, or has no basis in 
law or fact, or otherwise fails to 
state a fact which is material to 
the purpose for which it was 
submitted. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1324c(f).    
 
 According to Kouevi, Congress added this definition at 
the request of the former Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (“INS”) in response to decisions by the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review, Office of the Chief 
Administrative Hearing Officer (“OCAHO”) which held that 
“falsely make” does not include providing false information 
on application forms.  See, e.g., United States v. Remileh, 5 
OCAHO 724, 1995 WL 139207,  at *1 (O.C.A.H.O. Feb. 7, 
1995) (“[T]he attestation of an employee to false information 
on a Form I-9
13
 does not constitute the creation of a „falsely 
made‟ document in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c).”).   As 
Kouevi sees it, Congress‟s decision to amend 8 U.S.C. § 
1324(c), by defining  “falsely make” to include making false 
statements to obtain an immigration document, demonstrates 
that the question presented here, i.e., whether the first 
paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) applies to authentic 
immigration documents obtained by fraud, was “foremost in 
the mind of Congress in 1996, well after Campos-Serrano,”  
yet the first paragraph of § 1546(a) was not amended.  Again, 
we are not persuaded.  
 
 As we have explained, the statement from Campos-
Serrano which Kouevi relies upon was not intended to define 
the parameters of the first paragraph of § 1546(a).   Moreover,  
                                              
13
 Form I-9 is an Employment Eligibility Form. 
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Kouvei‟s reliance on the  language of the amendment creates 
a problem for him.  It shows that when Congress was asked to 
clarify the meaning of “falsely make” in another context, it 
defined the term to include documents procured by fraud.  
However, we need not discuss this claim in detail because it 
is rooted in Kouvei‟s interpretation of Campos-Serrano, and 
we have already explained why that case simply does not 
support Kouevi‟s contention that the first paragraph of § 
1546(a) does not criminalize the possession or use of an 
authentic immigration document obtained by fraud. 
Moreover, our interpretation of the first paragraph of  
§ 1546(a) is consistent with the Court‟s analysis in United 
States v. Moskal, 498 U.S. 103 (1990).  There, while 
construing a different statute, the Court held that “falsely 
made” “encompasses genuine documents containing false 
information.”  Id. at 110.  The statute at issue in Moskal was 
18 U.S.C. § 2314, which prohibits the interstate or foreign 
transportation of  “any falsely made, forged, altered, or 
counterfeited securities or tax stamps, knowing the same to 
have been falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited.”  
Moskal was a participant in a title-washing scheme.  Id. at 
105.  Other participants in the scheme bought used cars in 
Pennsylvania, rolled-back the odometers, and altered the titles 
to reflect the lower mileage.  Id.  The altered titles were then 
sent to other participants who submitted them to authorities in 
Virginia.  Id.  The Virginia authorities, who were unaware of 
the title alterations, issued Virginia titles containing the false 
mileage figures.  Id. at 105-06.  The washed titles were then 
sent back to Pennsylvania, where they were used to facilitate 
sales to unsuspecting buyers.  Id. at 106.  Moskal sent altered 
titles to Virginia and he received the washed titles back when 
they were returned to Pennsylvania.  Id.   
 Moskal was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2314 
by receiving two washed titles.  On appeal, he made the same 
linguistic argument in challenging his conviction under 18 
U.S.C. § 2314 that Kouvei makes here in challenging his 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).  Moskal claimed his 
conduct did not violate § 2314 because, although he was  
participating in a fraud (and thus had the requisite statutory 
intent), the washed titles were not themselves “falsely made.”  
Id. at 107.  He contended that since an authentic title had been 
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issued by appropriate state agencies that were unaware of any 
underlying fraud, the resulting title was genuine.  Since the 
title that the state issued was valid,  Moskal claimed they 
were not “falsely made” as required by the statute of 
conviction.  Id.   
 The Court‟s explanation of why it disagreed with 
Moskal is fatal to Kouevi‟s argument here.  In rejecting the 
argument, the Supreme Court explained:  
We think that the words of § 2314 
are broad enough, on their face, to 
encompass washed titles 
containing fraudulently tendered 
odometer readings.  Such titles are 
“falsely made” in the sense that 
they are made to contain false, or 
incorrect, information. 
 
Id. at 108-09.  The Court also rejected the claim that falsely 
made documents were synonymous with forged or 
counterfeited documents.  It wrote: 
Short of construing “falsely 
made” in this way, we are at a 
loss to give any meaning to this 
phrase independent of the other 
terms in § 2314, such as “forged” 
or “counterfeited,”  By seeking to 
exclude from § 2314‟s scope any 
security that is “genuine” or valid, 
Moskal essentially equates 
“falsely made” with “forged” or 
“counterfeited.”  His construction 
therefore violates the established 
principle that a court should give 
effect, if possible, to every clause 
or word of a statute. 
 
Id. at 109 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).   
 
 Moskal had argued that at common-law “falsely made” 
had an established common-law meaning equivalent to 
forgery.  498 U.S. at 114.  Therefore, “falsely made” 
excluded authentic or genuine documents that were merely 
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false in content.  Id. Accordingly, Moskal contended that 
Congress should be presumed to have adopted this common-
law definition in construing § 2314.  “[W]here a federal 
criminal statute uses a common-law term of established 
meaning without otherwise defining it, the general practice is 
to give that term its common-law meaning.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  However, Moskal concluded that the meaning of 
“falsely made” was ambiguous at common law. 
 
 Despite the rather obvious fact that Moskal‟s reasoning 
clearly applies here Kouevi cites United States v. Merklinger, 
16 F.3d 670 (6th Cir. 1994), in arguing that courts should 
limit Moskal to statutes that require a departure from the 
common law meaning of “falsely made” in order to punish 
conduct that Congress intended to reach.  Id. at 673-74 & n.4.  
This argument again focuses on the fact that the fourth 
paragraph of § 1546(a), prohibits the possession or use of an 
authentic immigration document obtained by fraud.  
According to Kouevi, it is therefore unnecessary to interpret 
the first paragraph of § 1546(a) to include authentic 
immigration documents obtained by fraud. 
 
 However, the argument ignores the fact that Kouevi‟s 
conduct is not punished by another provision of the statute.  
As noted, the fourth paragraph of § 1546(a) does not punish 
the possession or use of authentic immigration documents 
obtained by fraud.  Rather, it prohibits making a false 
statement when applying for an immigration document. 
 
 Nevertheless, Kouevi claims “additional legal 
authority” demonstrates that the first paragraph of § 1546(a) 
does not apply to authentic immigration documents obtained 
by fraud.   He relies on various rather tangential authorities 
such as the model jury instructions.   He points out the 
instructions pertaining to the first paragraph of  § 1546(a) tell 
jurors that the Government must prove that “the defendant 
uttered, used, attempted to use, possessed, obtained, accepted 
or received a forged, counterfeited, altered or falsely made 
document.” Moore‟s Federal Model Jury Instructions, 
Chapter 47, Instruction 47-2 (underlining is Kouevi‟s).  
 
 He then quotes the following statement from United 
States v. Polar, 369 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2004): 
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The district court specifically 
instructed the jury as follows: 
 
The indictment charges the 
defendant with violation of Title 
18 United States Code, Section 
1546(a).  That provision makes it 
a federal crime to knowingly 
possess a false or counterfeit Visa 
or other document required as 
evidence of an unauthorized stay 
or employment in the United 
States. 
 
Id. at 1251 n.2 (emphasis in original).   
 
 Lastly, Kouevi notes that the United States Attorneys‟ 
Manual states “The first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) 
proscribes the forging, counterfeiting, altering, or falsely 
making of certain immigration documents or their use, 
possession, or receipt.” 
 
www.usdoj.gov/usao/eouse/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/cr
m01524.htm.  Kouevi submits that description from the 
Manual clearly means that the first paragraph of § 1546(a) 
prohibits the possession of “certain immigration documents” 
only if they were forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely 
made.  As he sees it, that description does not mean that the 
first paragraph of § 1546(a) prohibits the possession of 
authentic immigration documents that were obtained by 
fraud.   
 
 Kouevi‟s “additional legal authority” argument is 
meritless.  As the Government notes, Model Jury Instruction 
47-2 was drafted to cover one application of the first 
paragraph of § 1546(a), i.e., the use of forged documents.  Id. 
(“The indictment charges the defendant with using (or 
attempting to use or uttering or possession or obtaining or 
accepting or receiving) a forged (or falsely made or 
counterfeit or altered) visa (or specify other document).”  The 
Model Instruction cited by Kouevi does not address the 
portion of the first paragraph which he was charged with 
violating, viz., the possession of an authentic immigration that 
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was procured by fraud.   
 
 The jury instruction in Polar also provides no comfort 
to Kouevi.  The defendant there had a passport which 
contained a counterfeit Alien Documentation Identification 
Telecommunication stamp mark (“ADIT”) and he used the 
passport to obtain Social Security cards.
14
  The issue before 
the court was whether the defendant‟s use of the passport 
containing a fraudulent ADIT stamp violated § 1546(a).  The 
district court‟s instruction was thus fashioned to meet the 
evidence of offending conduct there.  The instruction had 
nothing to do with whether the first paragraph of § 1546(a) 
applies to the possession or use of authentic immigration 
documents obtained by fraud. 
 
 Finally, we hardly need respond to Kouevi‟s attempt to 
elevate a statement from the United States Attorneys‟ Manual 
to the status of legal authority.  The Manual is an internal 
agency practice guide and it is not a definitive statement of 
the law, as the Manual expressly indicates.
15
  Kouevi‟s 
                                              
14
 An ADIT stamp mark “is placed in an alien‟s passport at a 
port of  entry or at  an [INS] district office; . . . this  stamp 
mark serves as temporary proof of lawful permanent 
residence in the United States; . . . and . . . serves as INS 
authorization for employment, such that a passport with an 
ADIT stamp mark can be used as identification to obtain a 
valid Social Security card.”  Polar, 368 F.3d at 1250 n.1. 
 
15
 See United States Attorneys‟ Manual, Section 1-1.00, 
“Purpose.” (“The United States Attorneys' Manual is 
designed as a quick and ready reference for United States 
Attorneys, Assistant United States Attorneys, and Department 
attorneys responsible for the prosecution of violations of 
federal law.  It contains general policies and some procedures 
relevant to the work of the United States Attorneys' offices 
and to their relations with the legal divisions, investigative 
agencies, and other components within the Department of 
Justice. . . .  The Manual provides only internal Department of 
Justice guidance.  It is not intended to, does not, and may not 
be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, 
enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or 
criminal. Nor are any limitations hereby placed on otherwise 
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argument invites us to cherry-pick the language of the Manual 
that affords arguable support for his position while ignoring 
other language that expressly negates using the Manual as 
legal authority.  Moreover, the statement he relies upon is not 
intended to limit the application of the first paragraph of § 
1546(a) to forged documents; it merely refers to one of the 
first paragraph‟s applications.  
 
 Lastly, Kouevi attempts to rely on the rule of lenity.  
We have explained the operation of that rule as follows: 
In interpreting an ambiguous 
criminal statute, the court should 
resolve the ambiguity in the 
defendant‟s favor.  The rule of 
lenity applies in those situations 
in which a reasonable doubt 
persists about a statute‟s intended 
scope even after resort to the 
language and structure, legislative 
history, and motivating policies of 
the statute.  The rule is not 
properly invoked simply because 
a statute requires consideration 
and interpretation to confirm its 
meaning.  It applies only if there 
is such grievous ambiguity or 
uncertainty in a statute  that, after 
seizing everything from which aid 
can be derived, the Court can 
make no more than a guess as to 
what Congress intended. 
 
United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 315 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citations, internal quotation marks and bracket omitted).   
 
 However, we do not think that the statute in question is 
sufficiently ambiguous to justify resort to the rule of lenity.  
“The simple existence of some statutory ambiguity, however,  
is not sufficient to warrant application of the rule of lenity, for 
most statutes are ambiguous to some degree.”  Dean v. United 
States,  556 U.S. 568, 577 (2009) (citation omitted).   
                                                                                                     
lawful litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.”). 
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 Kouevi does not explain the purported “ambiguity” in 
the first paragraph of § 1546(a).  He simply states that 
“history and structure allow for a reading that limits the scope 
of the first paragraph of § 1546(a) ¶ 1 to offenses involving 
only forged documents, and which excludes authentic 
documents procured by fraud.”  Therefore, he submits that 
“[i]n accordance with the rule of lenity, these alternate 
readings of § 1546(a) ¶ 1 mean that the conviction should be 
reversed.”  Kouevi‟s Br. at 23.   
 
 However, these are simply conclusory statements that 
do not demonstrate any ambiguity.  More importantly, as we 
have explained, we cannot breathe sufficient ambiguity into 
the first paragraph to justify applying the rule of lenity 
without ignoring the canons of statutory construction we have 
discussed.  The plain language of the statute reveals that the 
first paragraph of § 1546(a) must be read to prohibit the 
possession or use of authentic immigration documents which 
are obtained by fraud. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the district 
court. 
  
